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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
CHARGING FOR WATER IN SCOTLAND: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
by John W Sawkins, Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University 
and Daniel F Mackay, Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen 
1. Introduction 
During the summer months the issue of charging 
for water services enjoyed a prominent position on 
the English and Scottish political agendas, for very 
different reasons. In England the prolonged period 
of fine dry weather focused political and media 
attention on charging as a means of demand 
management in areas suffering from an acute 
shortage of water. In Scotland, where the drought 
was less severe, the debate centred on the question 
of the level of charges to be imposed by the three 
new Public Water Authorities (PWAs)1 due to take 
over responsibility for water services from the 
regional councils in 1996. 
A by-product of this increased public attention was 
the recognition that the Government adopted quite 
different charging policies for domestic water 
supplies in Scotland, England and Wales. At the 
height of the drought the Government affirmed its 
support for a policy of progressive domestic water 
metering in England and Wales. This reinforced 
the stance taken by the quality regulator, the 
National Rivers Authority2, which continued its 
work on identifying a whole series of schemes to 
augment supplies and develop new water resources 
south of the border3. In Scotland research 
commissioned by the Scottish Office4 confirmed the 
public perception that the country enjoyed abundant 
water resources. Pricing devices such as metering, 
used to supplement conventional demand 
management, were therefore rejected as being 
unnecessary and financially burdensome. Politically 
1 The North, East and West of Scotland Water Authorities will 
assume operational responsibility for water and sewerage services 
from the twelve Regional Councils on 1st April 1996. 
2 The English and Welsh water quality regulator. 
3 National Rivers Authority (1994) Water: Nature's Precious 
Resource. Publ: NRA. 
4 The research concluded, " thai there will be sufficient resources to 
meet average demands for public water supplies at the national [Le. 
Scottish] and regional levels until at least 2016." The Scottish Office 
(1995) Public Water Supplies in Scotland: An Assessment of 
Demands and Resources at 1994, Publ: The Scottish Office, p xl 
more concern was expressed over the absolute level 
of charges rather than the way in which those 
charges would be levied. 
Over the next few months, in the run up to Scottish 
local government reorganisation on 1st April 1996, 
appointees to the new PWA boards will be 
considering both issues: the overall level of charges 
and the way in which those charges will be levied. 
Faced with the tasks of raising additional revenue to 
finance large capital projects, harmonising regional 
charges and having their proposed schemes 
approved by the new customer watchdog the 
Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers' Council 
the authorities will be taking decisions, the effects 
of which will be felt by their customers well into 
the next millennium. With this challenge comes a 
unique opportunity to reassess one fundamental 
policy question from an economic point of view: 
how should Scottish consumers pay for their water 
services? 
In this paper we endeavour to answer this question 
by outlining and analysing three alternative charging 
schemes available to the new PWAs. Section 2 of 
the paper sets out the current charging regime 
within the present institutional structure . Section 
3 considers the impact on customers of moving 
from the current charging system to one of three 
alternatives: a licence fee, a per capita fee and a 
simple metering arrangement In section 4 we 
analyse the potential impact of a movement to these 
different charging systems for customers of the new 
PWAs . We conclude by drawing out the policy 
implications of the analysis. 
2. The Current Charging Regime 
At present Scottish consumers pay for water and 
sewerage services through the local authority 
council tax system, charges being based on the 
council tax valuation banding of houses.5 The fees 
5 The usual system of discounts applies. Adult households for 
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for water and sewerage services are, however, 
levied in slightly different ways; with water charges 
appearing as a separate item on council tax bills, 
but sewerage being financed from general tax 
revenues and therefore not identified separately. In 
effect Scottish consumers are charged for water and 
taxed for sewerage. For the purposes of this paper 
we confine our attention to water charges in order 
to abstract from the difficulties of imputing notional 
sewerage charges based on aggregate taxation 
figures. We argue that the analysis undertaken in 
the context of water carries over directly to 
sewerage and therefore nothing of substance is lost 
through making this assumption. The gains, 
however, in terms of data accuracy are 
considerable. 
We adopt 1994/5 as die 'base year' for our 
analysis, using the charges levied by the twelve 
regional and islands councils during that period as 
the reference. There are two institutional reasons 
for doing this, both related to the reform of local 
government finance and organisation in Scotland. 
In the first place the base year is sufficiently far 
removed from the period in which Scottish local 
government finances were reformed previously, in 
the move from the controversial 'community 
charge' to the current council tax system, to have 
allowed early administrative difficulties associated 
with the change to have been resolved. Secondly it 
is well before opposition to the 1996 local 
government reorganisation crystallised. 
Consequently the 1994/5 charge levels are not 
tainted by short term funding measures taken by 
local councils in 1995/6 in order to hold charges at 
an artificially low level in the period preceding the 
reform.6 
Tables 1 and 2 below set out the council tax 
property valuation bands and the regional household 
water charges relating to properties within each 
band. 
This charging system has several attractive features. 
From the consumers' point of view it is simple, 
difficult to evade and fairly equitable with 
customers in similar circumstances paying similar 
charges. Administratively it is simple to operate 
and relatively cheap to collect. As a property based 
tax the revenues from it are certain and losses 
through evasion are less of a problem than with 
example are entitled to 25% discount on their total bill. 
6 On 5/2/95 the Aberdeen Press and Journal reported that Grampian 
Regional Council would use £4million of accumulated reserves to 
subsidise water charges during 1995/6. 
other systems. 
However it has several disadvantages as well. 
Firstly the system is allocatively inefficient. In 
other words, prices do not reflect the incremental 
(marginal) costs to the community of satisfying 
incremental (marginal) demands. Consequently a 
community's net benefits may not be maximised 
under the system. Secondly, the property based flat 
charge gives no incentive for consumers to conserve 
water. Technically, consumers face a zero price for 
water at the margin; which may result in water 
being overused. Thirdly, although the system 
appears horizontally equitable, house valuation 
remains a rather poor proxy for total household 
water consumption in that charges bear some 
relation to income levels. Clearly a family of four 
living in a band D property would consume more 
water than a two adult pensioner household living 
in a similar property. And whilst the system of 
discounts for single adults removes one of the worst 
anomalies created by the system, others still remain. 
Overall then, whilst the present system of charges 
is administratively workable, and broadly acceptable 
to politicians and the public, there is a strong case 
to be made for examining closely practical 
alternative charging arrangements. 
3. Alternative Charging Arrangements 
The three alternative charging systems we consider 
in this paper are: i) a licence fee, ii) a per capita 
charge and iii) metering. The licence fee is 
assumed to be a flat rate charge of the conventional 
kind, applicable to every household7 supplied with 
water. The fee is invariant with respect to the 
quantity of water consumed, the number of people 
comprising the household, the size or value of the 
property. The per capita charge resembles the old 
community water charge, being levied on individual 
consumers rather than household units. Again the 
charge is invariant with respect to the quantity of 
water consumed and the size of property inhabited. 
Under metering, consumers are charged on the basis 
of the quantity of potable water consumed (£ per 
cubic metre). For this option we assume that a 
small standing charge8 of £10 is levied to cover the 
fixed costs of billing and other administration. 
Once again the charge is not related in any way to 
7 Earn household under this system is uniquely identified with a 
property. 
8 For the purposes of exposition we assume a zero standing charge 
for the first two options. Relaxation of this assumption is 
straightforward bat does not radically alter the results of the analysis. 
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the size of the property inhabited by a household. 
The first question to be addressed in this section is 
quite simply: what is die impact on customer 
charges of the three alternative schemes? To 
answer this we make two further assumptions. 
First, we assume that individual regions must raise 
as much revenue under the new charging 
arrangements as under the current council tax 
banding system.9 In other words, an assumption of 
'revenue neutrality' is made. Second, in order to 
calculate a unit charge for metered water we 
assume a consumption level of 148 litres per person 
per day: the median consumption figure arrived at 
by the Scottish Office's latest domestic water 
consumption survey.10 Table 3 lists charges by 
region under the three alternative charging regimes. 
Comparing the results reported in Table 3 to those 
in Table 2 it is clear that the level of the licence fee 
is very similar to the charge made to households in 
Band B of the current council tax system. The 
licence fee is in turn approximately twice the size 
of the per capita charge in line with the casual 
empirical observation of the preponderance of two 
person households. Generally there is a modest 
amount of variation in charges with the exception 
of me two outliers: Central Region (low) and 
Western Isles (high). 
Whilst the absolute level of charges is of some 
importance, more interesting is the question of the 
impact that a change in charging arrangements 
would have on individual households. In other 
words, who would win and who would lose under 
the alternatives schemes? A comprehensive analysis 
of the question is outwith the scope of this paper. 
Therefore we limit our discussion to the impact of 
the changes on three 'typical" household types: 
one-person ('single'), two person ('couple') and 
four person ('family'). Table 4 lists the alternative 
charging schemes and notes whether the three 
household types are either net gainers or net losers 
in terms of the level of water charges paid when 
moving away from the Council Tax banding 
system. 
9 We assume due mere ore no switching costs in moving between 
systems and that there are similar levels of non-payment under each 
option. 
10 The Scottish Office Environment Department (1993) " Domestic 
Water Consumption in Scotland in 1991", Foundation for Water 
Research, Marlow. Bucks. We argue that there is little variation in 
median domestic consumption across the Scottish regions. 
Although regional differences persist, some general 
national patterns emerge. Unsurprisingly a move 
from the council tax to the licence fee 
disadvantages all householders living in band A 
properties. A flat licence fee is more regressive 
than a graded council tax payment system. Single 
person households benefit from the per capita 
option, however households living in properties 
with a lower valuation are disadvantaged under the 
scheme if they contain more than one resident 
Metering appears to affect the greatest number of 
households adversely, particularly those containing 
a large number of people. This result may require 
revision, however, if it is found that the larger 
households benefit from economies of scale in 
water use. In other words, a four person household 
may require an amount less than four times the 
median consumption figure for individuals. The 
metering figures also take no account of potential 
savings should households economise on their water 
use. 
In general the results reinforce the conclusion that 
despite its flaws in terms of allocative efficiency the 
present system is more progressive than the per 
capita and licence fees. A change to either of these 
options would yield relatively greater benefits to 
those residing in properties in the higher valuation 
bands. Given the widespread opposition to 
community charge arrangements for local authority 
finance at the beginning of die decade we conclude 
that it is unlikely that either of these two options 
would be acceptable to consumers or the 
Government, in the short or medium term. The 
metering option however deserves further 
examination. 
We have already outlined the benefits of metering, 
noting its promotion of allocative efficiency and the 
incentive to conserve water. In the light of the 
Government's commitment to a policy of 
sustainable development throughout the economy 
this payment system, which would limit or reverse 
the rise in domestic consumption and could be used 
as a demand management tool on a selective basis, 
would encourage efficient consumption" and also 
delay the development of new resources. This 
brake on the pace of development would limit the 
environmental impact of such work, reduce 
overconsumption, and is another reason why 
metering may be seen as the 'first best' long term 
charging option for Scottish water. At present the 
11 As consumers would face a positive price for each unit 
consumed. 
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capital costs of installing meters in domestic 
premises are considered by policymakers to 
outweigh the benefits of this charging method. In 
addition the simple metering scheme outlined above 
shares with the other two alternatives the feature 
that it is more regressive than Council Tax 
arrangements. This, however, could be corrected 
through the implementation of a slightly more 
sophisticated set of metered charges. For example 
a 'block tariff' arrangement of the sort used by 
many electricity companies.12 
Given the long term upward trend in demand for 
potable water, and growing concern over the issue 
of conservation, we argue that a policy of installing 
water meters in all newly built properties 
throughout Scotland would be to the long term 
benefit of the country's water consumers.13 
4. The New Water Authorities: Charging 
Options 
On 1st April 1996 three new public water 
authorities (PWAs) will assume operational 
responsibility for water services in place of the 
regional and islands councils. It is therefore of 
some interest to discuss the impact that this 
institutional change will have on the water bills of 
consumers in the various Scottish regions. For this 
section of the paper we once again assume that the 
amount of revenue raised by the authorities under 
any alternative charging regime should correspond 
to revenue raised by the component regions under 
the present scheme: i.e. revenue neutrality.14 We 
also assume a consumption level of 148 litres per 
person per day for the calculation of metered 
charges. 
Before examining the alternative charging 
arrangements, we report illustrative charge figures 
for households in the different council tax bands 
within each of the new PWA regions. These are set 
out in Table 5. Two main assumptions were 
employed in the construction of this table. Firstly 
the charges were calculated using 1994/5 data. This 
has the advantage of allowing a comparison with 
the figures reported in Table 215, but does not 
12 Consumers are charged at one rate for tbe first block of water 
consumed and at a different rate for usage over and above this level. 
13 This policy has been working in England and Wales for several 
years. 
14 Throughout the analysis we set to one side the question of 
additional economies of scale that may be exploited by the new 
PWAs. 
reflect the impact of price inflation since then. 
Secondly, the 1994/5 information fails to reflect 
the impact on charges of the large capital 
investment programme required to meet new 
European Union quality standards.16 The impact of 
both of these assumptions is to reduce the estimated 
PWA charge levels quite substantially. 
Nevertheless, given these caveats the table is of 
interest in terms of illustrating relative charge 
levels. 
As anticipated the Northern Water Authority, 
serving many sparsely populated regions potentially 
has the highest charges. The figures contained in 
the table also give some indication of the extent to 
which a policy of charge harmonisation within 
water authority areas will affect consumers in 
different regions. To mention just one case, 
inhabitants of the Western Isles would experience a 
substantial reduction in the level of their water 
charges at the expense of consumers in Grampian 
and Tayside. It remains to be seen whether the 
boards consider such a policy workable within their 
particular areas. 
In Table 6 we report PWA charge levels calculated 
under the three alternative charging schemes. 
Once again we assert that the absolute level of 
charges is of less interest than the analysis of the 
impact of a change in charging arrangements on 
individual households. Table 7 mirrors the earlier 
Table 4 therefore in setting out the potential impact 
on customers of the new PWAs of a movement to 
these different charging systems. 
The regional differences apparent in Table 4 are 
attenuated in Table 7. However, once again some 
general patterns emerge. For example the move 
from the council tax to the licence fee puts all 
households in band A and most in band B at a 
disadvantage. Single person households again 
benefit from per capita charges. Overall, however, 
households living in properties with a lower 
valuation are more likely to face higher charges 
than those living in properties classified in bands F, 
GandH. 
15 Calculations were made using the same Scottish Office data that 
was used to set charges shown in Table 2. The figures contained in 
Table 2 are however slightly higher than Scottish Office estimates 
would suggest, as Regions made small upward charge adjustments to 
reflect particular local circumstances. 
16 Estimated by the Scottish Office to be £5billion over the next 15 
years. The Scottish Office (1992). 
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We note once again that despite its flaws, the 
council tax system of payment is more progressive 
than either die per capita or licence fee 
arrangements. Only metering offers the prospect of 
encouraging economy and efficiency in water 
consumption and we would argue that consumption 
savings would, over time, offset the capital cost of 
meter installation. Public policy considerations may 
lead the Government and the PWAs to delay the 
move towards metering on the grounds that water 
charges are a suitable device for the redistribution 
of income. Consequently they may wish to continue 
with the current charging system, despite its 
inadequacies, arguing that despite its imperfections 
it is the only truly progressive charging system 
available immediately. As discussed above slightly 
more sophisticated metering arrangements have the 
potential to remove this blemish leaving the new 
PWAs with a flexible, equitable and robust new 
charging system. 
5. Conclusion 
Although water metering may be a desirable long 
run policy objective for the new PWAs, the present 
council tax based system is a workable interim 
measure, perfectly capable of 'holding the fort' 
until universal domestic metering arrives. We argue 
that there is an inevitability about this process when 
seen in the light of growing public concern over the 
environment, and the Government's own attachment 
to the idea of sustainability development 
Consequently the PWAs would be well advised to 
work towards this policy objective through devices 
such as the compulsory domestic metering of new 
properties. 
In the meantime they should reaffirm their 
commitment to the council tax system17, rejecting 
any return to per capita or flat rate licence fees, 
whilst promoting the conservation of water through 
educational or advertising initiatives. By attending 
to matters such as leakage control the PWAs may 
take the opportunity to portray themselves as 
working in partnership with the public to achieve 
long run policy objectives such as sustainability. 
Ultimately, Scottish consumers will benefit through 
access to an abundant supply of high quality water 
at a reasonable price. 
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Table 1: Council Tax Property Valuation Bands 
Council Tax Band 
A 
B 
C 
w 
E 
F 
G 
H 
House Value 
not exceeding £27,000 
exceeding £27,000 and not exceeding £35,000 
exceeding £35,000 and not exceeding £45,000 
exceeding £45,000 and not exceeding £58,000 
exceeding £58,000 and not exceeding £80,000 
exceeding £80,000 and not exceeding £106,000 
exceeding £106,000 and not exceeding £212,000 
exceeding £212,000 
Source: Scottish Office. 
Tabk 2: Domestic Water Charges Per Household 1994-95. 
Charges refer to households containing two or more adults. 
REGION 
Borders 
Central 
Dumf. & Galloway 
Fife 
Grampian 
Highland 
Lothian 
Strathclyde 
Tayside 
Orkney 
Shetland 
Western Isles 
A 
61 
31 
56 
39 
-
 5 9 
59 
52 
53 
46 
82 
78 
129 
B 
72 
37 
65 
46 
69 
69 
61 
62 
54 
96 
90 
151 
C 
82 
42 
75 
52 
79 
78 
69 
71 
61 
109 
103 
172 
D 
92 
47 
84 
59 
89 
88 
78 
SO 
69 
123 
116 
194 
E 
112 
57 
103 
72 
109 
108 
95 
98 
84 
150 
142 
237 
F 
133 
68 
121 
85 
129 
128 
113 
116 
100 
178 
168 
280 
G 
153 
78 
140 
98 
148 
147 
130 
133 
115 
205 
194 
323 
H 
184 
94 
168 
118 
178 
177 
156 
160 
138 
246 
233 
388 
Source: Scottish Office: Water and Sewerage Costs 1994-1995 
Table 3: Levels of Charges under Alternative Regimes: The Regional Councils 
REGION 
Borders 
Central 
Dumfries & Galloway 
File 
Grampian 
Highland 
Lothian 
Strathclyde 
Tayside 
Orkney 
Shetland 
Western Isles 
Licence Fee 
£ 
68.80 
35.82 
67.11 
43.0? 
71.84 
71.38 
63.57 
56.29 
53.11 
86.35 
87.07 
131.58 
Per Capita Charge 
£ 
31.02 
14.65 
27.25 
17.79 
29.73 
30.16 
27.33 
24.88 
22.86 
32.45 
35.27 
51.63 
Metering Charge 
£ per m3 
0.49 
0.20 
0.43 
0.25 
0.47 
0.48 
0.43 
0.38 
0.34 
0.53 
0.58 
0.88 
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I Mean Charge | 69.67 I 28.75 I 0.45 | 
Table 4: Alternative Charging Regimes: Net Gainers and Losers 
The table below records the difference in the charge level for three different types of household, between the 
current Council Tax banding system and the three alternative regimes set out above. It is assumed that 1 person 
households receive a 25% discount under die present Council Tax system. No additional discounting adjustments 
are made for single households under the three proposed schemes. 
Scheme 
Licence Fee 
Per Capita Charge 
Metering Charge 
1 person household 
"Single" 
2 person household 
"Couple" 
4 person household 
"Family" 
In regions B,C,F,St,T,0,Sh,W, band A loses. 
In regions D,G.ELL bands A and B lose. 
No households lose. 
In regions B,D,G,HJL 
bands A-D lose. 
In regions St,T,Sh,W 
bands A-C lose. 
In regions C,F,0 bands 
A-B lose. 
In regions B,G,H,L,St 
households in band A 
lose. 
In regions 
B AG,H,L,T,Sh bands 
A-F lose. In regions 
C,F,St,0,W bands A-E 
lose. 
In regions 
B,CAG,HJL,St,T 
bands A-E lose. In 
regions F,0,Sh,W 
bands A-D lose. 
All households lose. 
Note: B = Borders, C = Central, D = Dumfries and Galloway, F = Fife, G = Grampian, H = Highland, L = 
Lothian, St = Strathclyde, T = Tayside, O = Orkney, Sh = Shetland, W = Western Isles. 
Table 5: Domestic Water Charges: The New Water Authorities (1994-95 data). 
Domestic household water charges. Charges refer to households containing two or more adults. 
Water Authority 
Northern 
Eastern 
Western 
A 
56 
45 
51 
B 
65 
53 
60 
C 
75 
60 
" 68 
D 
84 
68 
77 
E 
103 
83 
94 
F 
121 
98 
111 
G 
T40 " 
113 
128 
H 
168 
' 136 
"154 
Table 6: Levels of Charges under Alternative Regimes: The New Water Authorities 
Water Authority 
Northern 
Eastern 
Western 
Licence Fee 
£ 
67.25 
54.23 
56.90 
Per Capita Charge 
£ 
28.21 
22.96 
25.02 
Metering Charge 
£ per m3 
0.43 
0.32 
0.40 
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Table 7: Alternative Charging Regimes in the New Water Authorities: Net Gainers and Losers. 
The table below records the difference in the charge level for three different types of household, between a 
Council Tax banding system and the three alternative regimes. It is assumed that 1 person households would 
receive a 25% discount under Council Tax arrangements. 
Scheme 
Licence Fee 
Per Capita Charge 
Metering Charge 
1 person household 
"Single" 
2 person household 
"Couple" 
Jn N,Ea bands A-B lose. In W band 
No houseEoIdsTose. 
In N\W bands A-5 
lose. 
In Ea bands A-C lose. 
In N,Ea band A loses. 
In W no households 
lose. 
In N\W bands A-F 
lose. 
In Ea bands A-E lose. 
4 person household 
'Tamily" 
A loses. 
In N.Ea.W bands A-E 
lose. 
All households lose. 
Note: N = Northern, Ea = Eastern, W = Western. 
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